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ARTICLES
SECTION 17(a) OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND AN IMPLIED
ACTION: AN ANSWER IS IN SIGHT
The Securities Act of 19331 ('33 Act) and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934' ('34 Act) constitute interrelated elements of
the federal plan governing transactions in securities.' The '33 Act
emerged in the aftermath of the market crash of 1929." Congress'
I Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter '33 Act].
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) [hereinafter '34 Act].
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) ('33 Act and '34 Act are
rt of a complex securities scheme); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs Stores, 421 U.S.
3, 727-28 (1975) ('33 and '34 Acts are landmark statutes regulating securities). See also
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. Representa-
tive (later Speaker) Rayburn, for the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
stated, "the bill (H.R. 5480) [is] to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of secur-
ities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds
in the sale thereof .... Id. at 1. The Senate Report stated: "[the] purpose of this bill is to
protect the investing public and honest business. The basic policy is that of informing the
investor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign
commerce and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation." S. REP. No. 47,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. See also Douglas & Bates, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 172 (1933) (purpose of '33 Act is to prevent
fraudulent and excessive practices and to ensure full and open disclosure at every stage in
securities transactions).
I See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 (market crash inspired the '33 and '34 Acts). See also
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) ('33 and '34 Acts enacted in response
to events surrounding the Crash). President Franklin Roosevelt sent a message to Congress
on March 29, 1933 in which he submitted, "[i]n spite of many state statutes the public in
the past has sustained severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part
of many persons and corporations selling securities." HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
However, Professor Loss, a renowned securities scholar has stated, "The Securities Act of
1933 did not spring full grown from the brow of any New Deal Zeus." L. Loss, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF FEDERAL SEcuRmEs REGULATION 1 (2d ed. 1988). In actuality, the '33 Act, the
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initial contemplation was that regulation of the securities arena
might effectuate a national economic recovery by inspiring honest
dealings in securities and thereby restoring public confidence. To
that end, the '33 Act and the '34 Act have an arsenal of anti-fraud
provisions" to protect the public against the deceptive practices of
individuals and corporations selling securities. Section 17(a) of the
'33 Act (17(a)) generally proscribes fraud in the offer or sale of
securities;7 however, the extent of its enforcement is a question
springboard for the '34 Act, evolved during an era of state regulation of securities and
after several centuries of legislation in England. Id. at 1-3.
' See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. President Roosevelt's presidential message was
included in the introductory statement of the House Report. Id. at 1-2. President Roosevelt
reiterated the need for full publicity and information on every issue of new securities to be
sold in interstate commerce. Id. at 2.
' See, e.g., '33 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) (civil liability results from misstatements
or omissions in the registration statement required for a security); '33 Act § 12(1), 15
U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976) (private remedy permitted for violation of registration or prospectus
provisions of the '33 Act); '33 Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976) (statutory fraud provi-
sion conferring private right to sue).
The '34 Act is also replete with enforcement provisions. See, e.g., '34 Act § 9, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i (1976) (civil liability for fraudulent manipulation of stock prices); '34 Act § 16, 15
U.S.C. § 78p (1976) (civil liability for directors, officers and principal stockholders for neg-
ligent conduct); '34 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) (liability for fraud in connection with
purchase or sale of any security).
The Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] was created in 1934 by the
'34 Act. The SEC is an independent, bipartisan agency of the United States government
charged with administering federal securities legislation. See L. Loss, supra note 4, at 35.
Federal securities law consists of six statutes enacted between 1933 and 1940. See L. SODER-
QUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION 4-5 (1980). The six statutes are: the '33 Act; the '34 Act; the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939; the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940; and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. See D. RATNER,
SECURITIES REGULATION 6 (1980). The enforcement powers of the SEC include the power to
permanently or temporarily enjoin proscribed acts, and to transmit information to the
United States Attorney General in order to properly pursue criminal proceedings. See '33
Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1976); '34 Act § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976).
See '33 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation of communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made not misleading,
or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id. It should be noted that 17(a) does not expressly provide for civil liability. Id. See also
Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L.
REV. 627, 656 (1962). Senator Fletcher, one of the original drafters of the '33 Act con-
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that has spurred considerable debate.'
The purpose of this Article is to present the current state of the
law on the issue of whether a private right to sue exists under
17(a). The primary focus will be on the conflicting views among
the courts, including a review of the controversial Ninth Circuit
decision in In re Washington Public Power Supply System Security Liti-
gation.9 This Article will also investigate the prevailing views
among the commentators in the securities field. Finally, this Arti-
cle will suggest that an analysis of this issue, using a modified
Cort1 test, leads to the conclusion that an implied cause of action
does not exist under 17(a).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Implied Right of Action: Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934
Congress expressly granted a private right to sue in section
eleven" and section twelve1 ' of the '33 Act and in sections 9(e)'1 3
tended, "It]he most reasonable view regarding 17(a) of the 1933 Act is that Congress in-
tended that the Commission would use it to deal with flagrant cases of abuse." Id. Cf.
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772 (1979) (17(a) does not apply solely to fraud).
* See Scholl & Perkowski, An Implied Right of Action Under Section 17(a) The Supreme Court
Has Said "No", But Is Anybody Listening? 36 U. MIAMi L. REv. 41, 42 (1981); Comment, §
17 (a) of the '33 Act: An Alternative to the Recently Restricted Rule lOb-5, 9 Rtrr.-CAM. L.J. 340,
348 (1978).
0 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
10 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Supreme Court in Cort espoused a four pronged
analysis to be used when determining whether an implied remedy exists in a statute not
expressly providing for one. Id. at 78. For a discussion of the Cort analysis see infra note
36.
1 '33 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976). Liability pursuant to § 11 of the '33 Act is
imposed for material statements in the registration statement which are false or misleading,
and for failure to disclose material facts. Id. Defenses to § II liability do exist. Id. See Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727 (1975) (section 11 liability exists for
a false registration statement). See generally Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (elements of a § 11 cause of action).
Parties subject to § 11 liability include directors, chief executives, financial officers, ac-
countants who certify statements and underwriters. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURI-
TIES REGULAT1ON 142 (6th ed. 1987). See also Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271-73 (2d
Cir. 1967) (court discussed who can sue under § 11).
12 '33 Act §§ 12(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(l)-(2) (1976). Section 12(1) imposes civil liability
for sale of a security in violation of § 5 of the '33 Act. Id. Section 5 is the provision gov-
erning the registration of a security in the initial public offering of a security, § 5 also
covers the issuance of a prospectus. '33 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). Civil liability
pursuant to 12(1) is absolute, there is no defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(l) (1976). See also
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 3: 159, 1988
10(b),1 ' and 18(a)15 of the '34 Act. Despite these express liability
provisions, the bulwark of fraud liability has been grounded upon
section 10(b) of the '34 Act 6 and, more specifically, upon rule
1Ob-5. 17
Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1986). Section 12(2) is a general anti-fraud
provision. See generally Collins v. Signetics Corp., 443 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (ele-
ments of cause of action under § 12(2)), affid, 605 F.2d 110 (3rd Cir. 1979). Civil liability is
imposed for false or misleading statements in connection with a sale (not a purchase) of a
security through interstate commerce or the mails. See '33 Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1976). Section 12(2) does not require a false or misleading statement in the prospectus or
registration statement. See Gridley v. Sayre & Fisher Co., 409 F. Supp. 1266 (D.C. S.D.
1976) (negligent misstatement was actionable under § 12(2) of '33 Act). See also R. JEN-
NINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 11, at 834. Section 12(2) liability is broad enough to include
a false or misleading oral statement made in the sale of securities. Id.
" '34 Act § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976). Civil liability is imposed for unlawful manip-
ulation of stock prices. Id. See generally T. HAZEN, LAW OF SECuRmEs REGULATION 645
(1983) (section 9(e) liability detailed).
14 '34 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). Section 16(b) is a narrow provision which
protects against fraud in the sale of securities by corporate insiders. Id. For a discussion of
persons subject to section 16(b) liability see Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260
(2d Cir. 1969) (discussion of persons subject to 16(b) liability), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036
(1970). See also Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.) (difficulties in interpre-
tation of § 16(b)), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See generally Hazen, The New Pragmatim
Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 1 (1975) (complete
analysis of § 16(b)).
" '34 Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Civil liability under 18(a) is imposed for
false or misleading statements made in any report or document filed pursuant to the '34
Act or any rule thereunder. Id. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968)
(private remedy for defrauded investor who relied on a document filed with the SEC), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
16 '34 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) is a general provision pro-
scribing any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in violation of any rule
promulgated by the SEC which is deemed "necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors." Id. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203
(1976) (10(b) is characterized as a "catchall" by the SEC); L. Loss, supra note 4, at 702
(10(b) is an omnibus provision created by Congress to combat securities fraud).
" '34 Act, Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R § 240 10b-5 (1981). Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, or scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operated or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id. Rule I Ob-5 was adopted by the SEC to close a gap in the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 956 (1952). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically or restrictively).
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An implied right of action pursuant to rule 1 Ob-5 was first rec-
ognized in 1946,18 and three years later a concurrent implied
remedy was granted under 17(a). 9 In the succeeding years a sub-
stantial number of courts followed suit by declaring parallel im-
plied remedies under 17(a) and rule 10b-5." However, the lan-
guage of rule 10b-5 has enabled the courts to confer civil liability
See generally L. SODERQUIST, supra note 6, at 531 (review of rule I Ob-5); D. RATNER, supra
note 6, at 404 (same).
The impetus for the drafting of rule IOb-5 arose from the need to combat an imminent
fraud being perpetuated by a company president on the shareholders of the corporation.
See Proceedings, Conference on the Codification of Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793,
922 (1967) [hereinafter Proceedings]. Milton Freeman, one of the drafters of the rule Iob-5,
stated that he received a phone call while on the staff of the SEC, from an SEC regional
administrator who alerted Freeman to the imminent corporate fraud. Id. In response, Free-
man, along with the Director of the SEC's Trading and Exchange Commission, promptly
drafted rule 1Ob-5. Rule 1Ob-5 is a conglomeration of § 10(b) of the '34 Act and § 17(a) of
the '33 Act. Id. Contra Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 1ob-5: Implied Remedies and
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 V& L. REV. 641, 646 (1978) (author emphasizes
the differences between 17(a) and rule IOb-5). After being drafted, rule lOb-5 was im-
mediatly presented to the SEC and was unanimously approved. Proceedings, at 922. See gen-
erally L. Loss, supra note 4, at 699-810 (author provides useful background information of
the extent of the enforcement of rule lOb-5).
" Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Rule lOb-5
does not expressly provide for civil liability. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 729 (1979) (civil liability pursuant to rule Ob-5 not expressly granted).
However, the history of the courts' recognition of an implied remedy is extensive. See, e.g.,
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD (1981) (emphasizing the Supreme
Court's recognition of a right to sue); Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 Gzo. L.J. 891 (1977) (courts created an
implied right despite evidence of congressional intent to grant such a remedy).
There is no evidence that the SEC contemplated a private remedy under rule lOb-5.
Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463. The drafter of the rule, Freeman, contended that rule lOb-5
was enacted to delegate to the SEC the power to effectively combat fraud; private proceed-
ings were not considered. See Proceedings, supra note 17, at 922. Freeman stated, "[h]ow it
[rule lOb-5] got into private proceedings was by the ingenuity of members of the private
Bar starting with the Kardon case." Id. Freeman also asserted, "[i]t has been developed by
the private lawyers, the members of the Bar, with the assistance or. . . the connivance of
the federal judiciary who thought it was a very fine fundamental idea and that it should be
extended." Id. See generally SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (section
10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 are most litigated provisions in federal securities laws).
" See Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See generally Shulman,
Civil Liabilities and Securities, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 253 (1933) (civil liability is imposed for two
reasons: compensating investors and compelling compliance with the '33 and '34 Acts).
10 See, e.g., Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognition of a
private right), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th
Cir. 1975) (civil liability found under § 17(a)). See also Hazen, supra note 17, 648 n.35.
Despite the recognized differences between 17(a) and rule 1Ob-5 the court concurrently
granted implied remedies. Id. But see Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act: The
Wrong Place For a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 44 (1973) (court erred in implying a civil
remedy under 17(a)).
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encompassing a broader array of fraudulent practices.2 1 A private
cause of action under rule 10b-5 had become a "judicial oak
which ha[d] grown from little more than a legislative acorn". 2 In
comparison, 17(a) had an identity as a dormant cause of action.'3
B. 17(a) Gains Recognition
Section 17(a) emerged as a viable cause of action after a series
of Supreme Court decisions systematically restricted the availabil-
ity of a private right to sue under rule 1 Ob-5." In effect, the Su-
preme Court placed 17(a) in the forefront as a private remedy for
defrauded investors.25
' See supra note 17. See also Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 45-47. See generally
Herman & MacClean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (existence of implied rem-
edy under rule 1Ob-5 has been found and is now beyond "peradventure").
" See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737. Supreme Court recognized that there Was no
evidence of congressional intent to grant a private remedy under rule 10b-5, but a right
was conferred anyway. Id. See also Hazen, supra note 17, at 648 (Supreme Court caveat in
Blue Chip Stamps that a rule IOb-5 problem should be resolved in broad context of policy of
'34 Act).
s See Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 42. Section 17(a) has a narrow scope that led
to its being doomed to the existence of an alternate cause of action. Id. See also Hazen,
supra note 20, at 649 (17(a) exists as a shadow of rule 1 Ob-5). But see Comment, supra note
8, at 351-55 (favored 17(a) as a viable cause of action to rule lOb-5).
" See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723. In its first restrictive ruling, the
Supreme Court endorsed the Birnbaum rule enunciated by the circuit courts. See Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 749. The Birnbaum rule requires that a private plaintiff seeking relief
under rule 101>-5 be either a purchaser or a seller of securities. Id. at 731-32. The Court
further curtailed the plaintiff's ability to pursue civil litigation under rule lOb-5 in the
Hochfelder decision. In Hochfelder the Court held that in a rule 101-5 action a private plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant acted with scienter, and not mere negligence, in perpet-
uating the fraud. 425 U.S. at 193. Hence, a negligence standard will not support a private
remedy under section 10(b) of the '34 Act or rule 101-5. Id. In so holding, the Court
emphasized the fact that the express civil remedies of the '33 Act that permit recovery for
negligent conduct have strict procedural safeguards not provided in section 10(b) of the
'34 Act or rule 10b-5. See Hazen, supra note 20, at 668 (absence of procedural safeguards
would open the door to bothersome litigation). Moreover, the Supreme Court declared
that a plaintiff must prove an element of deception in the sale or purchase of a security to
recover in a rule 10b-5 action. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473-77. See generally L. Loss,
supra note 4, at 926 (federal courts creating tort actions can place reasonable restrictions
on them).
as See Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 42. The demise of rule 10b-5 implied liability
led to the revitilization of section 17(a) as a massive anti-fraud weapon for investors. Id. See
also Pitt, An SEC's Insider's View of the Utility of Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 5 SEc. REG. L.J. 3 (1977) (review of the feasibility of 17(a) cause of action). The recog-
nition of a private action under 17(a) invites the question of what standard to apply in civil
liability cases. See generally L. Loss, supra note 4, at 979-80 (discussion of recent Supreme
Court decision which elaborated on this question). The Supreme Court has focused on this
Section 17(a)
II. CONFLICTING VIEWS AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. Private Cause of Action Exists in Some Circuits
The circuit courts justified an implied right of action under
17(a) by focusing on the similiarities between 17(a) and rule IOb-
5.26 The decisions of the Second Circuit along with the decisions
of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits supported the
conclusion that civil liability for damages exists under 17(a).' The
common thread in those decisions is a comment made in a foot-
note written by Judge Friendly in his concurring opinion of SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur.28 The essence of Judge Friendly's often cited
issue in the context of an SEC injunction brought under 17(a). See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680 (1980). The Court held that scienter was the required showing to support an injunc-
tion brought by the SEC pursuant to rule 10b-5 and section 17(a) of the '33 Act, but not
pursuant to 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3). Id. at 697. The Court was influenced by its previous deci-
sions on the standards to be applied in a rule 10-5 action. Id. at 689-90. See also Steadman
v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1133 (5th Cir. 1979) (scienter not required under 17(a)(2) or
17(a)(3)).
" See, e.g., Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[Tlhere is little
practical point in denying the existence of an action under § 17(a) once it has been estab-
lished that an aggrieved buyer has a private action under §10(b)"), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
909 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Goldberg v. Kirshner, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); Daniel v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977) (section 10(b) liabil-
ity also gives rise to a §17(a) action, rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). See also
Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1975) (once §
10(b) claim was established §17(a) liability allowed to stand). Furthermore, the circuit
courts' recognition of an implied remedy under rule 1Ob-5 and the express reservation on
the issue of section 17(a) liability by the Supreme Court, opened the door for the lower
courts to find a private remedy under 17(a). See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
For the statement by the Supreme Court on this issue see Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.1 3.
" See Gaff v. FDIC, 814 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1987); Mosher v. Kane, 784 F.2d 1385 (9th
Cir. 1986), overruled in In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d
1349 (9th Cir. 1987); Kirshner, 603 F.2d 234; Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir.
1978); Daniel, 561 F.2d 1223.
401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC and Kline v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Although the issue in this case was whether scienter is required
in a rule lOb-5 action, the prominence of the decision stems from Judge Friendly's concur-
ring opinion. Id. at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring). Friendly recognized that the White
House Committee Report and the legislative history of 17(a) indicates that 17(a) was proba-
bly only intended by the legislature to afford plaintiff injunctive relief. d. However, in his
concurring opinion Friendly glossed over this issue when he stated, "there is little practical
point in denying the existence of a right under 17(a) once it has been established that an
aggrieved buyer has a private action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act - with the important
proviso that fraud, as distinct from mere negligence must be alleged." Id. In addition,
Friendly stated that to go further, "would totally undermine the carefully framed limita-
tions imposed on the buyer's right to recover pursuant to § 12(2) of the 1933 Act." Id.
This view was followed by other circuit courts. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554
F.2d 790, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1977) (action under 17(a) must allege scienter or it would nullify
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opinion is that the similiarities of rule 10b-5 and 17(a) should al-
low a plaintiff who establishes the elements of a private cause of
action under rule 10b-5 to pursue a private remedy under 17(a)
provided fraud, as distinguished from mere negligence, is also
alleged.'
It should be emphasized that while the circuit courts have rec-
ognized an implied cause of action under 17(a), most have done'so
with little or no analysis in the rationale of their decisions.3 0 In-
stead, the early circuit court decisions relied on an incomplete
version of Judge Friendly's statement along with a conviction that
the language of 17(a) is broad enough to support their conclusion
that a private right of enforcement exists.31 Later courts were ei-
ther bound by stare decisis or were influenced by the persuasive
civil provisions of the '33 Act). See generally L. Loss, supra note 4, at 978 (discussion of
17(a) in context of Texas Gulf Sulphur). But see Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 52
(implication of remedy under 17(a) takes on greater significance today than when Friendly
casually addressed the issue).
" Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring). See In re Washington,
823 F.2d at 1351; Sanders, 554 F.2d at 796. However, in relying on Judge Friendly's state-
ment, courts have frequently relied solely on a portion of the statement, and have failed to
consider Judge Friendly's reliance on § 17(a) cases on the assumed applicability of the scien-
ter standard required in private actions under 10(b). See, e.g., Kirshner, 603 F.2d at 241. See
also infra note 30 and accompanying text (further discussion on this* point).
" In re Washington, 823 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987). The courts that have adopted
Judge Friendly's statement, quoted it omitting, "the important proviso that fraud, as dis-
tinct from mere negligence must be alleged." Id. See, e.g., Kirshner, 603 F.2d at 241; Daniel,
561 F.2d at 1283-84.
This omission has grown in significance as the standard of conduct governing securities
litigation has become more refined. In re Washington, 823 F.2d at 1351. See, e.g., Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1979) (application of scienter standard for 17(a)(1), but not
17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3)). The circuit courts' categorical reliance on a cite from Texas Gulf
Sulphur was an indication to some commentators that the courts did not perceive the com-
plexity of this securities issue. See Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 52-57 (issue de-
served a more thorough analysis than was given by the courts).
The courts that misquoted judge Friendly were effectively eliminating any need to show
scienter under 17(a), and furthermore, eliminating any need to proceed under rule lob-5.
In re Washington, 823 F.2d at 1352.
", See supra note 30. But see Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 56 (courts' justification
for implied remedies based on broad language of statute has disturbing ramifications).
Some courts have rationalized the decision to grant an implied remedy in two ways. The
first has been the courts' desire to aid the SEC in enforcing 17(a). See, e.g., Demoe v. Dean
Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Alaska 1976) (court grounded decision to grant
private remedy under 17(a)(3) on desire to assist SEC). The second rationale offered by the
courts to justify their granting of a remedy was that the cases decided under rule 1Ob-5
provided precedent for the judiciary to compel its own ideas of equity upon the law. See
Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 56 (authors discuss this theory relied on by some
courts).
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authority of other circuit court decisions in holding that 17(a) per-
mits a private remedy; again, an extensive analysis was conspic-
uously lacking. 2
B. No Private Cause of Action Exists In Some Circuits Courts
Prior to 1987, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits determined that no
implied right to sue existed under 17(a), 3 while the Tenth Circuit
expressed "considerable doubt"-" as to whether an implied rem-
edy was justifiable. The Ninth Circuit stood firmly behind the po-
sition of the Second Circuit until In re Washington ,5 the contro-
versial decision that resulted in a direct clash between these two
circuits on this issue.
" See, e.g., Mosher v. Kane, 784 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986) (implied a private right
of action following Stephenson) overruled in In re Washington, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987);
Wigand v. Floteck, 609 F.2d 1028, 1038 (2d Cir. 1980) (found implied right to sue under
17(a) in light of Kirshner holding); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1978) (im-
plied civil liability under 17(a) relying on precedent). See also L. Loss, supra note 4, 978
(author recognizes that the Second Circuit was in the forefront of denying an implied ac-
tion without an analysis). But see In re Washington, 823 F.2d at 1350 (overruled Stephenson
and Mosher, found no private action under 17(a)); Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst.
Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 559 n.3 (2d Cir. 1985) (Judge Friendly's subsequent criticism of the
Second Circuit's variation of his statement, and his characterization of Kirshner as being
with "no analysis"); infra note 39 (circuits which have implied right to sue have recently
reversed or modified their prior positions).
U See, e.g., Devires v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986); Landry
v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982). The circuits that denied a private
a right to sue reached this conclusion through a Cort analysis. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
78 (1975). See also infra note 36 (four pronged approach discussed). See generally Note,
Section 17(a) of the '33 Act: Defining the Scope of Anti-Fraud Protection, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
859, 866-76 (1980) (Cort analysis does not support a private remedy under 17(a)).
" Ohio v. Peterson, Rail, & Barbara Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 689 n.I (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 895 (1981). The Ohio court noted that the appellant brought the claim under
rule 10b-5 and 17(a). Id. The court stated that this was not of any significance in the analy-
sis, due to the substantive similiarities between rule lOb-5 and 17(a). Id. However, the
court emphasized its "considerable doubt" whether an implied remedy exists under 17(a).
Id.
" In re Washington, 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit granted a sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc to consider a summary reversal of the district court's decision to
dismiss a 17(a) claim. Id. at 1350. This rehearing also considered whether to overrule two
previous Ninth Circuit decisions on this issue. Id. The court concluded that the Stephenson
and Mosher decisions were "incorrectly decided and are no longer precedent in this cir-
cuit." Id. at 1351. The court emphasized that the precedent in the Ninth Circuit held that
an implied remedy existed because of authority emanating from the Second Circuit. Id.
The Court refuted the Ninth Circuit's categorical reliance on the Second Circuit. Id. Fur-
thermore, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Second Circuit has indicated a willingness
to re-examine its prior position on this issue. Id. at 1352-53 n.5. See Yoder, 751 F.2d at 559
n.3 (Judge Friendly reconsidered Second Circuit's stance).
167
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 3: 159, 1988
The courts have relied on the four pronged test established by
the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash." The Cort analysis is to be ap-
plied in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a stat-
ute not expressly providing one."7 A private cause of action under
17(a) has been consistently denied by the courts relying on this
approach because 17(a) fails the second and third prongs of the
Cort test." Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit recognized in In Re
Washington that even the circuits which had found an implied
right to sue under 17(a) have recently reversed or modified their
prior positions.8
C. Lower Courts: Recent Trend Denying an Implied Remedy
While the district courts have historically been fragmented on
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Cort was a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court
that appeared to be a guide to the bench and bar on the relevant factors to consider when
deciding whether to imply a remedy from a statute not expressly providing for one. Id. at
78. The Supreme Court in Cort held that a private remedy does not exist under the Fed-
eral Elections Campaign Act. Id. at 84. The four factors to consider are: (1) whether the
statute creates a federal remedy in favor of the plaintiff; (2) whether the legislature in-
tended an implied remedy; (3) whether an implied action is consistent with the legislative
scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law. Id. at 78.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has indicated that the legislative intent is the central
inquiry of the Cort analysis. See Touche Ross & Co., v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See
also L. Loss, supra note 4, at 930-35 (discussion of the Cort analysis and subsequent Su-
preme Court cases which have modified the inquiry): Aiken, Availability of an Implied Civil
Cause of Action Under 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 9 N.C. J. INT. LAW. COMM. REG. 207
(1984) (test currently applied by the courts is a more restrictive analysis). But see Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 16 (1979) (notwithstanding the
Cort test, the Transamerica Court stressed the fact that when a statute expressly states cer-
tain types of remedies, such as an injunction, no other remedies were intended by
Congress).
17 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
88 See, e.g., In re Washington 823 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1987) (remedy denied due
to inconsistency with congressional intent and statutory scheme); Landry v. All Am. Assur-
ance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389-91 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Roskos v. Shearson-American Ex-
press Inc., 589 F. Supp. 627, 631 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (private action under 17(a) would un-
dermine statutory scheme of '33 Act). See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 11, at
874 (authors apply the Cort analysis to heed same results); Note, supra note 33, at 871-76
(language and legislative history of 17(a) leads to conclusion that no implied action exists
pursuant to 17(a)).
89 In re Washington, 823 F.2d at 1352-53 n.5. The Ninth Circuit indicated that the
Kirshner decision was "open to re-examination". Id. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit indi-
cated that the Fourth Circuit has also expressed a lack of conviction in its prior position.
Id. See SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1978). The Sev-
enth Circuit has determined that the issue is an "open question". See Teamsters Local 282
Pension Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1985).
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this issue,"0 the current trend denying a private right to sue under
17(a) cannot be ignored."1 The recent district court decisions that
have addressed this question have employed the Cort test and,
with reasoning similiar to the circuit courts that have denied an
implied remedy, have found that civil liability pursuant to 17(a)
would be inconsistent with congressional intent and the overall
statutory scheme of the '33 Act.4' An examination of these deci-
sions indicates that the district court judges were influenced by
the recent realignment of the circuit courts. 4 A survey of the re-
cent state court decisions illustrates that the decisive trend away
from denying an implied remedy has permeated the state level."
" See, e.g., Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (no implied
action); Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1496 (D. Del.
1984) (no private action). Butsee Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1231 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (private right of action granted).
" See, e.g., Mursan Corp. v. Florida Penn Oil & Gas, 638 F. Supp. 259, 261 (W.D. Pa.
1986) (court denied private remedy noting trend away from implied remedies in circuit
courts), affd, 813 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1987); Pennington v. Thomas McKinnon Sec. Inc., No.
86 - 3672, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1986) (same).
"' See, e.g., Jiffy Lube Int'l Inc. v. Grease Monkey Holding Co., No. 87-k-1082, slip op.(D.Del. Oct. 8, 1987) (no indication of legislative intent and an inconsistency with statutory
scheme); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 482-88 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same); Hudson v.
Capital Management Int'l Inc., 565 F. Supp. 615, 625-27 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (private right of
action under 17(a) would undermine Congress' careful statutory scheme).
4 See supra note 41.
" See, e.g., Mann v. Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1064-66 (D. Del. 1986) (Su-
preme Court of Delaware denied a private action); CPC Int'l Inc. v. Mckesson Corp., 70
N.Y.2d 268, 275, 514 N.E.2d 116, 123, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 812 (1987) (New York Court of
Appeals denied a private remedy); Mauersberg v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 116 App. Div. 2d
417, 501 N.Y.S.2d 748, 751 (3d Dep't 1986) (appellate court of New York refused to rec-
ognize a private action). The state court decisions rely on a thorough Cort analysis. See CPC
Int'l Inc., 70 N.Y.2d at 280-84, 514 N.E. 2d at 121-24, 519 N.Y.S. 2d. at 809-12. Further-
more, the state courts noted the recent decisions of the circuits which reflected a change in
their prior positions allowing a private remedy or which indicated a willingness to recon-
sider their opinions granting civil liability. Id. at 280. 514 N.E. at 120-21, 519 N.Y.S. 2d at
808-09.
The '33 Act confers jurisdiction on both the state and federal courts, as opposed to the
'34 Act over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See Hazen, supra note 20,
at 646. Allowance of a statutory cause of action in state court could prompt a defrauded
investor either to bring or remove a case to that court when no common law or federal
remedy would otherwise be granted. See Cherner, Considering The State Court As A Forum
For Securities Actions, 9 CuMs. L. REV. 663, 669 (1979) (recent decisions of the federal courts
should alert an attorney to consider the state court as an attractive forum whenever
feasible).
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III. THE CONSENSUS OF THE COMMENTATORS
A strong argument for denying a private right to sue pursuant
to 17(a) can be found among the commentators in the securities
field." Support for their conclusion is derived from the legislative
history of the '33 Act. 6 Furthermore, the commentators empha-
size that where Congress intended civil liability in the '33 Act the
provision expressly stated it." Commentators have suggested that
See, e.g., Douglas & Bates, supra note 3, at 182. Section 17(a) does not broaden civil
remedies, "This seems clear by negative implication, since sections 11 and 12 expressly
state the remedies which are available." Id. See also L. Loss, supra note 4, at 977-80 (regard-
ing private right to sue under 17(a), "if anything can be stated categorically, the answer
should be no."); Ruder, supra note 7, at 656-57 ("[the] history can be interpreted as dem-
onstrating that Congress did not intend that a private right of action exist for violation of
Section 17(a) .... ). Cf. H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcurms LAw HANDBOOK (1982) (on issue of
17(a),"an implied remedy could be based on Rule 10b-5, making the Section 17(a) remedy
redundant.") But see Hazen, supra note 20, at 655-58 (support for 17(a) private remedy).
See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), cert. denied sub nona. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1968) (Judge Friendly
stated: "[TIhere is unanimity among the commentators . . . [17(a)] was intended only to
afford a basis for injunctive relief and, on a proper showing, for criminal liability").
" See, e.g., L. Loss, supra note 4, at 977. Loss regards the comments made by Commis-
sioner Landis of the Federal Trade Commission, who played an active role in drafting the
'33 Act, as a reflection of congressional intent:
The suggestion has been made on occasion that civil liabilities arise from a violation
of Section 17, the first subsection of which makes unlawful the circulation of false-
hoods and untruths in connection with the sale of a security in interstate commerce
or through the mails. But a reading of this section in the light of the entire Act
leaves no doubt but that violations of its provisions give rise only to a liability to be
restrained by injunctive action or, if willfully done, to a liability to be punished
criminally.
Id. (citing Landis, Liability Sections of The Securities Act, 18 Am. ACCOUNTANT 330, 331
(1933)).
Congressional intent has been further evidenced by statements made by Senator
Fletcher, another drafter of the '33 Act. See Ruder, supra note 7, at 656. Senator Fletcher
wrote, in a memo on 17(a): "It is to be noted that enforcement of the provision of the new
subsection is left to injunction, stop order, and criminal prosecution. No civil liability at-
taches for any violation thereof." Id. (quoting 78 CONG. REC 8711-12 (1934)).
While Congess did not expressly state its intent regarding a private action under 17(a),
the House Committee Report has been relied on to support the notion that no implied
remedy was intended. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-10. The House Report listed
sections 11 and 12 as those that define civil liability imposed by the '33 Act. Id. The report
stated: "To impose a greater responsibility apart from constitutional doubts, would unnec-
essarily restrain the conscientious administration of honest business with no compensating
advantage to the public." Id. at 10. The Senate Report supports the same conclusion. See S.
REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
"' See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-10. Another argument which is frequently as-
serted rests on the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. See L. Loss, supra note 4, at
979; Ruder, supra note 7, at 656-57 (author discusses the application of this latin maxim).
But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 126-37 (1977) (proper focus should be
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the objectives sought by Congress, mainly, investor protection,
maintenance of a stable securities market and an attempt to pre-
vent unnecessary costs in securities transactions, are best fostered
through the interpretation that a private remedy does not exist
under 17(a).' 8
IV. PROPOSED ANALYSIS
The analysis proposed for reaching a final determination on
whether a private cause of action exists under 17(a) involves a
threshold examination of the contemporary legal context in which
the issue arises and an applicaton of a modified Cort test.49
A. Conservative Trend of the Supreme Court
The growing tendency of the courts to imply a cause of action
prompted the Supreme Court to intervene and mandate the appli-
cation of a more stringent analysis to be applied in implied action
cases.50 As a result, the recognition of an implied right to sue has
been curtailed in the securities field, as well as in other areas of
the law.5 1 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated its re-
luctance to fashion a remedy in securities law when the Court is
not certain that Congress intended such a remedy. 2 Therefore,
the question of whether or not a private remedy is implied in
17(a) is contemplated against a backdrop which indicates that civil
on investor protection and statutory purpose rather than mechanical methods of statutory
construction).
See generally Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 64 (authors believe courts that imply
a remedy based on "investor protection at all costs" create an incongruity in securities
laws).
" Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See infra notes 54-67 (discussion of Cort and its
progeny).
"e See Aiken, supra note 36, at 214 (current version of the Cort analysis is stringent).
"' See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979) (denial of remedy
under 17(a) of '34 Act); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979).
Transameria involved a question whether an implied remedy existed under section 206 of
the Investors Advisors Act. Id.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to imply a remedy in other areas of the law. See,
e.g., Car(, 422 U.S. at 82-84 (no implied remedy under Federal Election Campaign Act);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981) (no implied
remedy found in Equal Pay Act).
" See Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 20-23 The Supreme Court took the stance that the com-
plexity of the security statute led to the determination that Congress deliberately omitted
civil liability. Id.
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liability would not be recognized by the Supreme Court."
B. Modified Cort Analysis
It is suggested that a modified Cort analysis should be used to
determine whether an implied remedy exists under 17(a). This
analysis would balance investor protection and the preservation-of
the complex statutory scheme of the '33 Act."
It is submitted that the four prongs of the Cort analysis should
be reprioritized to include a primary focus on the statutory
scheme of the '33 Act, followed by an inquiry into the legislative
intent. The tertiary consideration should be whether the plaintiff
is a member of the class the statute intended to benefit, and fi-
nally, it should be determined whether the question is properly
one of state or federal law. 5
The first question posed in this analysis is whether an implied
remedy is consistent with the underlying statutory scheme of the
'33 Act. Section 17(a) must be reviewed in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Aaron v. SEC." In Aaron, the Court held that
an imposition of an SEC injunction pursuant to 17(a)(1) must be
based on the establishment of scienter, while the appropriate stan-
dard of relief under 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) requires only a showing
of negligence. 7 Provisions of the '33 Act which expressly permit
" See Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 59 n.108 (chart evidencing the conservative
attitude of the Supreme Court on securities questions).
" See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985). The Su-
preme Court indicated a reluctance to tamper with the '33 Act, calling it an "enforcement
scheme crafted with such evident care." Id. See generally Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8,
at 64 (implication of remedy under section 17(a) based on "investor protection at all costs"
creates substantial imbalance in federal securities laws).
" Compare Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (Supreme Court's analysis) with infra notes
56-67 and accompanying text (modified Cori test proposed for securities law questions).
" SEC v. Aaron, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). Aaron involved an SEC injunction under 17(a) of
the '34 Act. Id. at 682. See generally L. Loss, supra note 4, at 783-85 (discussion of Aaron
decision and implication of a 17(a) action).
6 Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697. The Court in Aaron concentrated on the language of the
statute rather than the relief sought. Id. at 696-97. A scienter standard is mandated under
rule 1Ob-5 for injunctions and private remedies because of the "deception" requirement.
Id. at 696. Applying this reasoning, scienter would be required under 17(a)(1) only, due to
the language of the statute. Id. In comparison, the language of 17(a)(2) does not suggest a
scienter requirement. Id. Moreover, 17(a)(3) focuses on the effect of particular conduct on
an investor rather than the culpability of the person involved; therefore, scienter is not
required. Id.
Section 17(a)
civil liability must be compared to 17(a). Sections eleven and
twelve grant a private remedy upon mere proof of negligence;
however, section eleven and twelve liability hinges on the satisfac-
tion of strict procedural requirements." The Aaron decision sug-
gests that a private right of action under 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)
would permit recovery upon a showing of negligence, absent any
procedural limitations." A major criticism of this result lies in the
fact that a plaintiff who alleges negligence pursuant to 17(a)(2) or
17(a)(3) could circumvent the procedural restraints of sections
eleven and twelve. 0 Implication of a private remedy under 17(a)
would undermine the comprehensive legislative scheme of the '33
Act.61
The second prong of the modified Cort test is the determination
of congressional intent. A private remedy should not be inferred
from the language of 17(a)." The legislative history of the '33 Act
indicates that Congress was concerned with the perpetuation of
honest business to the benefit of the public; this goal is best effec-
" See supra notes 11 & 12 for discussion of sections 11 and 12. See also L. Loss, supra
note 4, at 883-912 (elaboration on substantive and procedural aspects of these provisions).
60 See '33 Act §§ 11 & 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976). An exam-
ple of a procedural safeguard is found in section I I(e). Section 1 (e) provides that in any
action brought under this provision, the court may require the plaintiff to post security for
costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). Furthermore, sections 11 and 12 are subject to the two-
pronged statute of limitations of section 13 of the '33 Act. '33 Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m
(1976). But see Bateman, Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 304 n.9
(1985) (Aaron decision involved SEC injunction under 17(a), Court did not expressly state
that same standards would apply for an implied 17(a) remedy). See generally In re Washing-
ton Pub. Power Sup. Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1987) (Aaron suggests
that if an implied action is brought pursuant to 17(a), a scienter standard would govern
only 17(a)(1)).
" See L. Loss, supra note 4, at 784. Loss contends that the effect of granting an implied
remedy under 17(a) would render sections 11 and 12 superfluous. Id. See also Dyer v. East-
ern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 904-05 (D. Me. 1971) (analysis of 17(a) and
sections 11 and 12 in the context of the '33 Act).
" In re Washington, 823 F.2d at 1355. See Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d
381 (1982). The Landry court stated: "The creation of an implied cause of action junder
17(a)] would effectively frustrate the carefully laid framework of the Act." Id. at 390. See
also Roskos v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 627, 631 (E.D. Wis. 1984)
(private remedy under 17(a) "would cause the statutory and judicially-crafted restrictions
on § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act to atrophy and fall away as
securities fraud cases hustle in the back door of § 17."). See generally Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (legislative scheme of the securities laws work as an
integrated whole).
" See supra note 7. See also In re Washington, 823 F.2d at 1353 ("The language of section
17(a) reveals no intent to create a private remedy.").
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tuated by limiting civil liability to an action grounded upon sec-
tions eleven and twelve."
It is conceded that the third and fourth prong of this analysis
can be easily satisfied. Section 17(a) was established to protect in-
vestors and therefore, based on this fact, a federal right of action
exists.' " However, even if an implied remedy is not recognized
under 17(a) there exist considerable alternatives for investor
redress."6
The least important element of this analysis is the determina-
tion of whether the cause of action is traditionally in the domain
of state law. Federal securities law exerts a pervasive influence on
the national securities market." The purpose and scope of federal
securities regulation indicates that the question of an implied rem-
edy under 17(a) is not traditionally relegated to state law.67 Not-
withstanding the fact that the fourth prong encourages civil liabil-
ity, an implied remedy does not exist because the first and second
prongs are the most substantial considerations in this analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The results of this analysis lead to only one conclusion-that an
implied remedy does not exist pursuant to 17(a). Yet,'until this
debate is resolved by the Supreme Court it will continue to be one
of the more controversial issues in securities law.
The Supreme Court on several occasions has declined to con-
front this issue;68 however, this hands-off position may change in
" See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-10. See also SENATE REPORT Supra note 3, at I
(aim is to protect honest enterprise, restore public confidence and aid in restoring buying
and consuming power). For other indications of congressional intent, see supra note 46.
" See Scholl & Perkowski, supra note 8, at 60 (investor is in the class the statute intended
to benefit). But see In re Washington, 823 F.2d at 1354 (even if plaintiff is in class statute
intended to benefit, second and third prong must be satisfied). See generally Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Transportation Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981) (Supreme Court will not
engraft a remedy when there is no indication of congressional intent).
" See supra notes 6 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 11-17 (express liability
provisions of '33 and '34 Act). See generally Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (aim of the '33
and '34 Acts is to provide flexible enforcement mechanisms to ensure investor protection).
" See Note, supra note 33, at 875 (securities law questions traditionally in the federal
domain).
67 See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 11, at 878.
See, e.g., Herman & MacClean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983) (Court
expressly reserved decision on whether 17(a) affords private remedy); Teamsters v. Daniel,
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light of the recent Ninth Circuit decision in In re Washington. The
result of that decision is a direct clash between the Second and the
Ninth Circuits. This is an opportune time for the Supreme Court
to take a stance.
Julianne Gennuso
439 U.S. 551, 557 n.9 (1979) ("In light of our disposition of this case, we express no views
on this issue."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 n.6 (1975)
("We express, of course, no opinion on whether § 17(a) in light of the express civil reme-
dies of the 1933 Act gives rise to an implied cause of action.").
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